Abstract. In this paper we first develop two new STIT based deontic logics capable of solving the miners puzzle. The key idea is to use pessimistic lifting to lift the preference over worlds into the preference over sets of worlds. We also discuss a more general version of the miners puzzle in which plausibility is involved. In order to deal with the more general puzzle we add a modal operator representing plausibility to our logic. We present a sound and complete axiomatization.
Introduction
Research on deontic logic is divided into two main groups: the ought-to-be group and the ought-to-do group. The ought-to-do group originates from von Wright's pioneering paper [27] . Dynamic deontic logic [19, 26] , deontic action logic [22, 6, 24] , and STITbased deontic logic [11, 13, 23] belong to the "ought-to-do" family.
In recent years, the miners puzzle [12] quickly grabs the attention of lots of deontic logicians [28, 7, 4, 5, 9] . The miners puzzle goes like this:
Ten miners are trapped either in shaft A or in shaft B, but we do not know which one. Water threatens to flood the shafts. We only have enough sandbags to block one shaft but not both. If one shaft is blocked, all of the water will go into the other shaft, killing every miner if they are inside. If we block neither shaft, both will be partially flooded, killing one miner.
Lacking any information about the miners' exact whereabouts, it seems acceptable to say that:
(1) We ought to block neither shaft.
However, we also accept that (2) If the miners are in shaft A, we ought to block shaft A. But we also know that (4) Either the miners are in shaft A or they are in shaft B.
And (2)-(4) seem to entail (5) Either we ought to block shaft A or we ought to block shaft B.
Which contradicts (1) .
Various solution to this puzzle has been proposed [28, 7, 4, 5, 9] . Willer [28] claims that any adequate semantics of dyadic deontic modality must offer a solution to the miners puzzle.
The existing STIT-based deontic logic [11, 13, 23] does not offer a satisfying solution to this puzzle: although the deduction from (2)- (4) to (5) is blocked by the dyadic deontic operator defined in Sun [23] , but both Horty [11] and Sun [23] are unable to predict (1) . We discuss this in detail in Section 2.2.
In this paper we first develop two new STIT-based deontic logics, referring them as pessimistic utilitarian deontic logic (PUDL 1 and PUDL 2 ), which are capable of blocking the deduction from (2)-(4) to (5) and are able to predict (1)- (4) . We further consider a more general version of the miners puzzle in which the factor of plausibility is involved. Plausibility does not play a serious role in the original miners puzzle. It seems the plausibility of miners being in shaft A is equal to the plausibility of miner being in shaft B. If we are in a new scenario that the miners are more plausibly in shaft A, then in addition to statements (2) and (3), the following is acceptable: (6) We ought to block shaft A.
A logic for the miners scenario should both solve the original miners puzzle and give right predictions in the plausibility involved scenario. In this paper we extend PUDL 2 to PUDL + 2 by adding a modal operator representing plausibility. We show that PUDL + 2 gives right predictions in the plausibility involved miners scenario.
The structure of this paper is as follows: in Section 2 we review the existing solutions to the miners puzzle and the existing STIT-based deontic logic. In Section 3 we develop PUDL 1 and PUDL 2 to solve the original miners puzzle. In Section 4 we develop PUDP + 2 for the plausibility involved miners scenario. Section 5 is conclusion and future work.
Background

Solutions to the miners puzzle
Several authors have provided different solutions to the miners puzzle. We summarize the following approaches:
Kolodny and MacFarlane [12] give a detailed discussion of various escape routes. For example we may solve the paradox by rejecting (2) and(3) and instead accepting (7) If we know that the miners are in shaft A, we ought to block shaft A.
(8) If we know that the miners are in shaft B, we ought to block shaft B.
Kolodny and MacFarlane [12] argue that such solution is not satisfying. Then they conclude that the only possible solution to the puzzle is to invalidate the argument from (2) to (5). To do this, Kolodny and MacFarlane state we have three choices: rejecting modus ponens (MP), rejecting disjunction introduction (∨I), rejecting disjunction elimination (∨E). Among these three Kolodny and MacFarlane further demonstrate that the only wise choice is to reject MP.
Willer [28] develops a fourth option to invalidate the argument form (2) to (5): falsify the monotonicity. In his solution MP can be preserved (there are very good reasons to do so) and we are unable to derive the inconsistency.
Cariani et al [4] argue that the traditional Kratzer's semantics [14] of deontic conditionals is not capable of solving the puzzle. They propose to extend the standard Kratzer's account by adding a parameter representing a "decision problem" to solve the puzzle. Roughly, a decision problem contains a representation of action and a decision rule to select best action. Cariani et al [4] use a partition of all possible worlds to represent actions, and the decision rule they used to select action is essentially the same as the MaxiMin principle-the decision theoretic rule that requires agents to evaluate actions in terms of their worst conceivable outcome and choose the 'least bad" one among them. Such treatment shares some similarity with a special case of our logic to be in Section 3. In our logic every agent's actions are also represented by a partition of all worlds. And we use pessimistic lifting (to be introduced later) to compare actions, which is the same as MaxiMin.
Carr [5] argues that the proposal of Cariani et al is still problematic. To develop a satisfying semantics, Carr uses three parameters to define deontic modality: an informational parameter, a value parameter and a decision rule parameter. According to Carr's proposal, (1) to (3) are all correct predictions and no contradiction arise within her framework.
Gabbay et al [9] offers a solution to the miners puzzle using ideas from intuitionistic logic. In their logic "or" has an intuitionistic interpretation. Then the deduction from statement (2) , (3) and (4) to (5) is blocked.
STIT-based deontic logic
In STIT-based deontic logic, agents make choices and each choice is represented by a set of possible worlds. A preference relation over worlds is given as primitive. Such preference relation is then lifted to preference over sets of worlds. A choice is better than another iff the representing set of worlds of the first choice is better than the representing set of worlds of the second. A proposition φ is obligatory (we ought to see to it that φ) iff it is ensured by every best choice, i.e., it is true in every world of every best choice.
Therefore the interpretation of deontic modality is based on best choices, which can only be defined on top of preference over sets of worlds. Preference over sets of worlds is defined by lifting from preference over worlds. There is no standard way of lifting preference. Lang and van der Torre [15] summarize the following three ways of lifting: -strong lifting: For two sets of worlds W 1 and W 2 , W 1 is strongly better than W 2 iff ∀w ∈ W 1 , ∀v ∈ W 2 , w is better than v. That is, the worst world in W 1 is better than the best world in W 2 . -optimistic lifting: W 1 is optimistically better than W 2 iff ∃w ∈ W 1 , ∀v ∈ W 2 , w is better than v. That is, the best world in W 1 is better than the best world in W 2 . -pessimistic lifting: W 1 pessimistically better than W 2 iff ∀w ∈ W 1 , ∃v ∈ W 2 , w is better than v. That is, the worst world in W 1 is better than the worst world in W 2 .
In Horty [11] , Kooi and Tamminga [13] and Sun [23] strong lifting is adopted. Applying strong lifting to the miners scenario, all the three choices block neither, block A and block B are the best choices. "we ought to block neither" is then not true in the miners scenario. To understand this more accurately, we now give a formal review of STIT-based deontic logic of Sun [23] . We call such logic utilitarian deontic logic (UDL).
The language of the UDL is built from a finite set Agent = {1, . . . , n} of agents and a countable set Φ = {p, q, r, . . .} of propositional letters. Let p ∈ Φ, G ⊆ Agent. The UDL language, L udl is defined by the following Backus-Naur Form:
Intuitively, [G]φ is read as "group G sees to it that φ". G φ is read as "G ought to see to it that φ". G (φ/ψ) is read as "G ought to see to it that φ under the condition ψ".
The semantics of UDL is based on utilitarian models, which is a non-temporal fragment of the group STIT model.
Definition 1 (Utilitarian model).
A utilitarian model is a tuple (W, Choice, ≤, V ), where W is a nonempty set of possible worlds, Choice is a choice function, and ≤, representing the preference of the group Agent, is a reflexive and transitive relation over W . V is a valuation which assigns every propositional letter a set of worlds.
The choice function Choice : 2 Agent → 2 (1) for each i ∈ Agent it holds that IndChoice(i) is a partition of W ; (2) for Agent = {1, ..., n}, for every x 1 ∈ IndChoice(1), . . . , x n ∈ IndChoice(n),
w ≤ v is read as v is at least as good as w. w ≈ v is short for w ≤ v and v ≤ w. Having defined utilitarian models, we are ready to review preferences over sets of possible worlds.
Definition 2 (preferences over sets of worlds via strong lifting [23] ). Let X, Y ⊆ W be two sets of worlds. X s Y (Y is at least as good as X) if and only if (1) for each w ∈ X, for each w ∈ Y , w ≤ w and Definition 3 (dominance relation [11] ). Let G ⊆ Agent and K, K ∈ Choice(G). K
From a decision theoretical perspective, K s G K means that no matter how other agents act, the outcome of choosing K is no worse than that of choosing
Definition 4 (restricted choice sets [11] ). Let G a groups of agents.
Choice(G/X) = {K : K ∈ Choice(G) and K ∩ X = ∅} Intuitively, Choice(G/X) is the collection of those choices of group G that are consistent with condition X.
Definition 5 (conditional dominance [23] ). Let G be a group of agents and X a set of worlds. Let K, K ∈ Choice(G/X).
Definition 6 (Optimal and conditional optimal [11] ). Let G be a group of agents,
In the semantics of UDL, the optimal choices and conditional optimal choices are used to interpret the deontic operators.
Definition 7 (truth condition). Let
Here φ = {w ∈ W : M, w |= φ}.
Challenge from the miners puzzle The miners scenario is described formally by a utilitarian model as M iners = (W, Choice, ≤, V ), where W = {w 1 , . . . , w 6 }, Choice(G)
Group G has three choices: block neither, block A and block B. The group of other agents has one dummy choice: choosing W . According to the semantics based on strong lifting, all the three choices are optimal. Therefore M iners, w 1 G (block neither), which means UDL fails to solve the miners puzzle.
Pessimistic utilitarian deontic logic
We now introduce pessimistic utilitarian deontic logic (PUDL) to solve the miners puzzle. We use such name because we adopt pessimistic lifting instead of strong lifting in PUDL. We develop two logics, call them PUDL 1 and PUDL 2 respectively. PUDL 1 is obtained from simply replacing strong lifting in UDL by pessimistic lifting. It turns out that PUDL 1 is sufficient to solve the miner puzzle. But it turns out that PUDL 1 is bothered by other problems in deontic logic. PUDL 2 also solves the miners puzzle, and it is less problematic than PUDL 1 .
PUDL 1
Informally, according to the pessimistic lifting block neither is the only optimal choice in the miners scenario. Therefore "we ought to block neither" is true. It can be further proved that both (2) and (3) are true while the deduction from (2)- (4) to (5) is not valid. Therefore PUDL 1 offers a satisfying solution to the miners paradox. We now start to explain these arguments formally. G (φ/ψ) to L udl to represent "from the pessimistic perspective, G ought to see to it that φ" and "from the pessimistic perspective, G ought to see to it that φ in the condition ψ" respectively. The truth condition for p1 G φ and p1 G (φ/ψ) are defined as follows: Definition 9 (truth conditions). Let M be a utilitarian model and w ∈ W .
M, w |=
Now we return to the miners scenario. According to the pessimistic semantics, block neither is the only optimal choice. So we can draw the prediction that "we ought to block neither" i.e. M iners, w 1 p1 G (block neither). Moreover, given the condition of miners being in A, block A becomes the only conditional optimal choice. Hence we have "if the miners are in A, then we ought to block A", i.e. M iners, w 1 p1 G (block A/in A). The case for miners being in B are similar. Although we have both "if the miners are in A, then we ought to block A" and "if the miners are in B, then we ought to block B", by Proposition 2 below we can avoid the prediction that "we ought to block either A or B". Hence no contradiction arise. Therefore PUDL 1 gives right prediction meanwhile avoids contradictions. It therefore offers a viable solution to the miners puzzle.
PUDL 2
Although PUDL 1 solves the miners puzzle, it still has some drawbacks. On the intuitive side, PUDL 1 is not free from Ross' paradox. Ross' paradox [20] originates from the logic of imperatives, and is a well-known puzzle in deontic logic which can be concisely stated as follows:
Suppose you ought to mail the letter. Since mail the letter logically entails mail the letter or burn it, you ought to mail the letter or burn it.
, which means it is not free from Ross' paradox.
On the technical side, PUDL 1 is difficult to be finitely axiomatized. This is because PUDL 1 contains group STIT. Herzig and Schwarzentruber [10] show that if |Agent| ≥ 3 then group STIT is not finitely axiomatizable.
To fix these flaws, we develop PUDL 2 . We show that PUDL 2 solves the miners puzzle and is free from the Ross's paradox. We further give an axiomatization of PUDL 2 .
Language Similar to L udl , the language of the PUDL 2 is built from Agent and Φ. But for the sake of axiomatization, we simplify group STIT in UDL to individual STIT. In order to define pessimistic lifting syntactically we add the preference and universal modality to our language . For p, q ∈ Φ and i ∈ Agent, the language L 2 pudl is given by the following Backus-Naur Form:
Intuitively, [i]φ means "agent i sees to it that φ". φ means "φ is true everywhere". 2 [≤]φ means "φ is weakly preferable" while [<]φ means "φ is strictly preferable". [≥]φ means "φ is unpreferable ". We use ♦, ≤ and < as the dual for , [≤] and [<] respectively.
Semantically the preference relation ≤ corresponding to [≤] is required to be a linear pre-order order. That is, ≤ is reflexive, transitive and total. The preference relation < corresponding to [<] is required to satisfy the following: w < v iff w ≤ v and v ≤ w. Lifting of preference can be defined in L 2 pudl only with these constrains. Liu [17] observes that it is sufficient to define optimistic lifting with ≤ being partial order. But to define strong and pessimistic lifting, ≤ is required to be linear.
says that for all ψ-world, there is no φ world which is better. In other words, every ψ-world is at least as good as every φ-world. That is, the worst ψ-world is at least as good as the best φ-world.
says that for all φ-world w there is a ψ-world which is at least as good as w. In other words, for the best φ-world w there is a ψ-world which is at least as good as w. That is, the best ψ-world is at least as good as the best φ-world.
-pessimistic lifting: φ ≤ p ψ ::= (ψ → ≥ φ). Intuitively, (ψ → ≥ ψ) says that for all ψ-world w, it is at least as good as some φ-world. That is, the worst ψ-world is at least as good as the worst φ-world.
We use φ < p ψ as an abbreviation of (φ ≤ p ψ) ∧ ¬(ψ ≤ p φ). Obligation and conditional obligation are defined in our language as follows:
Intuitively, agent i is obliged to see to it that φ iff it is possible for i to see to it that φ and seeing to it that φ is strictly better than ¬φ in the pessimistic sense.
Semantics The semantics of pessimistic utilitarian deontic logic is based on the pessimistic utilitarian model, which is a non-temporal individual fragment of the STIT model.
Definition 10 (Pessimistic utilitarian model).
A pessimistic utilitarian model is a tuple M = (W, IndChoice, ≤, <, V ), where W is a nonempty set of possible worlds, IndChoice is an individual choice function, ≤ is a reflexive, transitive and connected relation over W , representing the preference of the group Agent. < is a sub-relation of ≤ such that for all w, w ∈ W , w < w iff w ≤ w and w ≤ w. The individual choice function IndChoice : Agent → 2 2 W must satisfy the following conditions:
(1) for each i ∈ Agent it holds that IndChoice(i) is a partition of W ; (2) for Agent = {1, ..., n}, for every x 1 ∈ IndChoice(1), . . . , x n ∈ IndChoice(n),
Let R i be the equivalence relation induced by IndChoice(i). Then (w, w ) ∈ R i iff there is K ∈ IndChoice(i) such that {w, w } ⊆ K. IndChoice(i) = {R i (w) : w ∈ W }, where R i (w) = {w ∈ W : (w, w ) ∈ R i }. The truth condition of formulas of L 2 pudl is defined as follows: Definition 11 (truth conditions). Let M be a pessimistic utilitarian model,
The axiomatization of PUDL 2 is a fragment of the axiomatization of PUDL + in the next section. The following proposition shows that PUDL 2 is free from Ross' paradox.
Another analysis to the miners puzzle The miners scenario is described formally by a pessimistic utilitarian model as M iners
Agent i is able to see to it that: block neither, block A and block B.
[i]block neither is true in worlds w 1 and w 2 . According to the pessimistic semantics, [i]block neither is strictly better than ¬block neither. Therefore i ought to block neither. That is, M iners p , w 1 p2 G (block neither). Moreover, given the condition of miners being in A, [i]block A is better than ¬block A. Hence we have "if the miners are in A, then i ought to block A". That is, M iners p , w 1 p2 i (block A/in A). The case for miners being in B is similar. It remains to show that although we have both "if the miners are in A, then we ought to block A" and "if the miners are in B, then we ought to block B", but we cannot logically derive "we ought to block either A or B". This is done by the following proposition.
Plausiblity involved pessimistic utilitarian deontic logic
The interplay of plausibility and preference are heavily discussed in qualitative decision theory [3, 8] . Boutilier [2] uses the modality of plausibility and preference to define conditional goals. Lang et al [16] use plausibility and preference to define hidden desire.
In this section we develop plausiblity involved pessimistic utilitarian deontic logic PUDL + 2 to analyze the plausibility involved miners puzzle. The language of PUDL + 2 is L 2 pudl extended with plausibility operators. Formally, for p, q ∈ Φ and i ∈ Agent, the language L 2+ pudl is given by the following Backus-Naur Form:
Plausibility involved pessimistic lifting is defined as follows:
Intuitively, φ ≤ p p ψ says that the most plausible ψ worlds are better than the most plausible φ worlds from a pessimistic perspective. We use φ < 
Semantics Definition 12 (Plausibility involved pessimistic utilitarian model).
A plausibility involved pessimistic utilitarian model is a tuple (W, IndChoice, ≤, <, ≤ p , < p , V ), where (W, IndChoice, ≤, <, V ) is a pessimistic utilitarian model. ≤ p is a reflexive, transitive and connected relation over W , representing plausibility. < p is a sub-relation of ≤ p such that for all w, w ∈ W , w < p w iff w ≤ p w and w ≤ p w.
The truth condition of formulas in L 2+
pudl is the same as L 2 pudl , except those formulas contains plausibility operators.
Definition 13 (truth conditions). Let M be a pessimistic utilitarian model, w ∈ W . M, w |= pudl
In the generalized miners puzzle. Since it is more plausible that miners are in shaft A, block A is the only optimal choice. Therefore i block A is true. Given the miner are in B, block B is the conditional optimal choice, therefore i (block B/in B). 
In this paper we first develop two new STIT based deontic logics capable of solving the miners puzzle. The key idea is to use pessimistic lifting to lift preference over worlds to preference over sets of worlds. To deal with the more general miners scenario we add modal operators representing plausibility. A complete axiomatization is given. Concerning future works, the most natural extension is to replace non-temporal STIT by temporal STIT logic [18] .
Definition 14 (maximal consistent set (MCS)). A set of formulas Γ is maximally consistent if Γ is consistent and any proper extension of Γ is not consistent. 
-W 0 = {w|w is a MCS and for all φ ∈ Γ + , φ ∈ w}; -For every i ∈ Agent, R 0 i is a binary relation on W 0 defined by wR Deleting <-cluster Note that converse of item (2) of Proposition 7 is not true because there may be two worlds w and v in W 0 such that w < 0 v and v < 0 w. In this case we say that w and v are in the same < 0 -clusters. To deal with this we follow Benthem [25] to use the technique called Bulldozing [21] to transform M 0 to a new model M 1 such that there is no <-cluster in M 1 .
Definition 16 (cluster).
A <-cluster is an inclusion-maximal set of worlds C such that w < v for all worlds w, v ∈ C. Similarly for ≤ p -cluster.
where:
-W 1 = W 0− ∪ i∈I C i , here I is a set index of all <-clusters of W 0 , W 0− = W 0 − i∈I C i , C i = C i × Z, Z is the set of natural numbers. -R -< 1 is defined as follows: For each C i , choose an arbitrary linear order < 1,i . Define a map β : W 1 → W 0 by β(x) = x if x ∈ W 0− and β(x) = w if x is a pair (w, n) for some world w and integer n. We define < 1 via the following cases: • Case 1: x or y is in W 0− . In this case we let x < 1 y iff β(x) < 0 β(y).
• Case 2: x ∈ C i and y ∈ C j , i = j. In this case we let x < 1 y iff β(x) < 0 β(y).
• Case 3: x ∈ C i and y ∈ C i . In this case , x = (w, m) and y = (v, n). There are two sub-cases: * Case 3.1: If m = n, we use the natural ordering on Z: (w, m) < 1 (v, n) iff m < n. * Case 3.2: If m = n, we use the linear ordering < 1,i : (w, m) < 1 (v, m) iff w < 1,i v.
